ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Thomas Carothers is vice president for global policy at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace and author of Aiding Democracy Abroad:
The Learning Curve (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1999).
Civil society has become one of the favorite buzzwords
among the global chattering classes, touted by presidents and political
scientists as the key to political, economic, and societal success. As
with Internet stocks, however, civil society's worth as a concept has
soared far beyond its demonstrated returns. To avoid a major disappointment
in the future, would-be buyers should start by taking a closer look at
the prospectus.
The
Concept of Civil Society Is a Recent Invention
Enlightenment needed. The term "civil society"
can be traced through the works of Cicero and other Romans to the ancient
Greek philosophers, although in classical usage civil society was equated
with the state. The modern idea of civil society emerged in the Scottish
and Continental Enlightenment of the late 18th century. A host of political
theorists, from Thomas Paine to Georg Hegel, developed the notion of civil
society as a domain parallel to but separate from the state -- a realm where
citizens associate according to their own interests and wishes. This new
thinking reflected changing economic realities: the rise of private property,
market competition, and the bourgeoisie. It also grew out of the mounting
popular demand for liberty, as manifested in the American and French revolutions.
The term fell into disuse in the mid-19th century as political philosophers
turned their attention to the social and political consequences of the
industrial revolution. It bounced back into fashion after World War II
through the writings of the Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci, who revived
the term to portray civil society as a special nucleus of independent
political activity, a crucial sphere of struggle against tyranny. Although
Gramsci was concerned about dictatorships of the right, his books were
influential in the 1970s and 1980s with persons fighting against dictatorships
of all political stripes in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Czech, Hungarian,
and Polish activists also wrapped themselves in the banner of civil society,
endowing it with a heroic quality when the Berlin Wall fell.
Suddenly, in the 1990s, civil society became a mantra for everyone from
presidents to political scientists. The global trend toward democracy
opened up space for civil society in formerly dictatorial countries around
the world. In the United States and Western Europe, public fatigue with
tired party systems sparked interest in civil society as a means of social
renewal. Especially in the developing world, privatization and other market
reforms offered civil society the chance to step in as governments retracted
their reach. And the information revolution provided new tools for forging
connections and empowering citizens. Civil society became a key element
of the post-cold-war zeitgeist.
NGOs
Are the Heart of Civil Society
Not really. At the core of much of the current enthusiasm about
civil society is a fascination with nongovernmental organizations, especially
advocacy groups devoted to public interest causes -- the environment, human
rights, women's issues, election monitoring, anticorruption, and other
"good things." Such groups have been multiplying exponentially in recent
years, particularly in countries undertaking democratic transitions. Nevertheless,
it is a mistake to equate civil society with ngos. Properly understood,
civil society is a broader concept, encompassing all the organizations
and associations that exist outside of the state (including political
parties) and the market. It includes the gamut of organizations that political
scientists traditionally label interest groups -- not just advocacy NGOs
but also labor unions, professional associations (such as those of doctors
and lawyers), chambers of commerce, ethnic associations, and others. It
also incorporates the many other associations that exist for purposes
other than advancing specific social or political agendas, such as religious
organizations, student groups, cultural organizations (from choral societies
to bird-watching clubs), sports clubs, and informal community groups.
Nongovernmental organizations do play important, growing roles in developed
and developing countries. They shape policy by exerting pressure on governments
and by furnishing technical expertise to policy makers. They foster citizen
participation and civic education. They provide leadership training for
young people who want to engage in civic life but are uninterested in
working through political parties. In many countries, however, NGOs are
outweighed by more traditional parts of civil society. Religious organizations,
labor unions, and other groups often have a genuine base in the population
and secure domestic sources of funding, features that advocacy groups
usually lack, especially the scores of new ngos in democratizing countries.
The burgeoning ngo sectors in such countries are often dominated by elite-run
groups that have only tenuous ties to the citizens on whose behalf they
claim to act, and they depend on international funders for budgets they
cannot nourish from domestic sources.
Civil
Society is Warm and Fuzzy
That depends on whether you like snuggling
up to the Russian mafia and militia groups from Montana as well as to
your local parent-teacher association. They're part
of civil society too. Extrapolating from the courageous role of civic
groups that fought communism in Eastern Europe, some civil society enthusiasts
have propagated the misleading notion that civil society consists only
of noble causes and earnest, well-intentioned actors. Yet civil society
everywhere is a bewildering array of the good, the bad, and the outright
bizarre. A random walk through Web pages on the Internet helps convey
a sense of that diversity. Recognizing that people
in any society associate and work together to advance nefarious as well
as worthy ends is critical to demystifying the concept of civil society.
As commentator David Rieff wrote recently in connection with Bosnia, "[Former
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan] Karadzic represented the aspirations of ordinary
Serbs in that extraordinary time all too faithfully, and could rightfully
lay just as great a claim to being an exemplar of civil society as Vaclav
Havel." If one limits civil society to those actors who pursue high-minded
aims, the concept becomes, as Rieff notes, "a theological notion, not
a political or sociological one."
The idea that civil society inherently represents the public good is
wrong in two other ways as well. Although many civic activists may feel
they speak for the public good, the public interest is a highly contested
domain. Clean air is a public good, but so are low energy costs. The same
could be said of free trade versus job security at home or free speech
versus libel protection. Single issue ngos, such as the National Rifle
Association and some environmental groups, are intensely, even myopically,
focused on their own agendas; they are not interested in balancing different
visions of the public good. Struggles over the public interest are not
between civil society on the one hand and bad guys on the other but within
civil society itself.
Moreover, civil society is very much concerned with private economic
interests. Nonprofit groups, from tenants' organizations to labor unions,
work zealously to advance the immediate economic interests of their members.
Some civil society groups may stand for "higher" -- that is, nonmaterial-principles
and values, but much of civil society is preoccupied with the pursuit
of private and frequently parochial and grubby ends.
Strong Civil Society Ensures Democracy
Tempting thought. An active, diverse civil society often does
play a valuable role in helping advance democracy. It can discipline the
state, ensure that citizens' interests are taken seriously, and foster
greater civic and political participation. Moreover, scholars such as
Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam -- whose influential 1995 article,
"Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," chronicled an apparent
decline in U.S. community-oriented associations -- have argued forcefully
that a weak civil society leads to a lack of "civic engagement" and "social
trust." But other evidence suggests that a strong civil society can actually
reflect dangerous political weaknesses. In a 1997 article that some have
nicknamed "Bowling With Hitler," Princeton professor Sheri Berman presented
a sobering analysis of the role of civil society in Weimar Germany. In
the 1920s and 1930s, Germany was unusually rich in associational life,
with many people belonging to the sorts of professional and cultural organizations
that are thought to be mainstays of pro-democratic civil society. Berman
argues, however, that not only did Germany's vibrant civil society fail
to solidify democracy and liberal values, it subverted them. Weak political
institutions were unable to respond to the demands placed on them by the
many citizens organizations, leading the latter to shift their allegiance
to nationalist, populist groups and eventually to the Nazi Party. In the
end, the density of civil society facilitated the Nazis' rapid creation
of a dynamic political machine.
Even in established democracies with strong political institutions, however,
there are reasons to doubt the simplistic idea that when it comes to civil
society, "the more the better." As early as the 1960s, some scholars warned
that the proliferation of interest groups in mature democracies could
choke the workings of representative institutions and systematically distort
policy outcomes in favor of the rich and well-connected or, more simply,
the better organized. In the 1990s, warnings about "demosclerosis" have
intensified as advocacy and lobbying organizations continue to multiply.
Democracy
Ensures A Strong Civil Society
No guarantees here either. Japan has been a stable democracy for
half a century but continues to have a relatively weak civil society,
particularly in terms of independent civic groups working on the kinds
of issues that activists in the United States and Europe hold dear, such
as the environment, consumer protection, human rights, and women's issues.
In France, one of the mother countries of Western liberal democracy, civil
society takes a distant back seat to a powerful state. Spain, the exemplar
of recent democratic transitions, is relatively weak in associational
life. Political parties and elections are what ensure a pluralism of political
choices; they can certainly operate in a country with only lightly developed
civic associations. Some American political analysts criticize Japan,
France, Spain, and other countries where civic participation is low, arguing
that these states are at best stunted democracies because they lack what
Americans believe is an optimal level of citizen engagement. Many Japanese,
French, and Spanish people, however, contend that their systems better
accord with their own traditions concerning the relationship of the individual
to the state and allow their governments to make more rational, less fettered
allocations of public goods. Obviously, the argument that a democracy
is not a real democracy unless it has American-style civil society is
not only wrong but dangerous. A strong belief in civil society should
not fuel an intolerant attitude toward different kinds of democracies.
Civil
Society Is Crucial for Economic Success
It's not so simple. As part of their "all good things go together"
approach, enthusiasts hold out civil society as a guarantee not only of
political virtue but also of economic success. An active, strong civil
society, they say, can give useful input on economic policy issues, facilitate
the growth of private enterprise, and help ensure that the state does
not suffocate the economy. In practice, however, the connection between
economic growth and civil society is not so straightforward.
Compare two cases. South Korea's economic miracle was built on the back
of a repressed civil society, especially a besieged labor sector. Only
in the 1980s, when the military regime felt it could afford to loosen
up, was civil society given space to flourish. Unions, student groups,
and religious organizations took full advantage of the opportunity and
pressed bravely and effectively for democratization. Heroic as they were,
these groups cannot be given credit for one of the fastest-growing economies
to emerge in the last 50 years. By contrast, Bangladesh is rich in civil
society, with thousands of NGOs, advocacy groups, and social service organizations
operating at the national and local levels. Yet this wealth of ngos, by
no means a new phenomenon in Bangladesh, has not translated into wealth
for the people. Bangladesh remains one of the poorest countries in the
world, with a per capita income of less than $350.
A well-developed civil society can be a natural partner to a successful
market economy. When citizens reach a comfortable standard of living,
they have more time, education, and resources to support and take part
in associational life. And many sectors of civil society can reinforce
economic development by encouraging sound governmental policies and by
increasing the flow of knowledge and information within a society. As
with the relationship between civil society and democracy, however, it
is important not to assume any iron laws of causality. The path to economic
success is not necessarily paved with civil society, and a strong civil
society can co-exist with a relatively weak economy (and vice versa).
What's more, too much or the wrong type of civil society can be economically
harmful. Some economists believe, for example, that Latin American labor
unions, a mainstay of the region's civil society, have been one of the
largest obstacles to Latin America's economic growth and stability.
Real
Civil Society Doesn't Take Money from the Government
Oh, really? When civil society groups wage a campaign for freedom
in a dictatorship, a key element of their political bona fides is complete
independence, financial and otherwise, from the government. In democratic
and democratizing countries, however, the rules are different. Many civil
society groups receive government funding. In parts of Western Europe,
government support for civil society is widespread, including among groups
that take on the government, such as human-rights and environmental organizations.
Even in the United States, governmental funding of civil society is much
more extensive than many people realize. A major comparative study of
nonprofit sectors, sponsored by Johns Hopkins University, found that "Government
is thus almost twice as significant a source of income for American nonprofit
organizations as is private giving, despite the presence there of numerous
large foundations and corporate giving programs."
The
Rise of Civil Society Means the Decline of the State
Definitely not. The rise of civil society induces some to see
a nearly state-free future in which tentative, minimalistic states hang
back while powerful nongovernmental groups impose a new, virtuous civic
order. This vision is a mirage. Civil society groups can be much more
effective in shaping state policy if the state has coherent powers for
setting and enforcing policy. Good nongovernmental advocacy work will
actually tend to strengthen, not weaken state capacity. A clear example
is U.S. environmental policy. Vigorous civic activism on environmental
issues has helped prompt the creation of governmental environmental agencies,
laws, and enforcement mechanisms. Nothing cripples civil society development
like a weak, lethargic state. In Eastern Europe, civil society has come
much further since 1989 in the countries where governments have proved
relatively capable and competent, such as Poland and Hungary, and it has
been retarded where states have wallowed in inefficiency and incompetence
such as Romania, and for parts of the decade, Bulgaria.
Outside of dictatorial contexts, states can play a valuable role in developing
a healthy civil society. They can do so by establishing clear, workable
regulatory frameworks for the nongovernmental sector, enacting tax incentives
for funding of nonprofit groups, adopting transparent procedures, and
pursuing partnerships with nongovernmental organizations. Civil society
can and should challenge, irritate, and even, at times, antagonize the
state. But civil society and the state need each other and, in the best
of worlds, they develop in tandem, not at each other's expense.
Civil
Society Has Gone Global
Not quite. The recent success of the International Campaign to
Ban Landmines, in which a coalition of ngos (together with some governments,
in particular Canada's) took on the United States and other powerful states,
sparked tremendous interest in the idea of transnational civil society.
Activists, scholars, journalists, and others began talking up the phenomenon
of advocacy across borders. Global civil society appears a natural extension
of the trend toward greater civil society within countries. At last count,
more than 5,000 transnational NGOs -- NGOs based in one country that regularly
carry out activities in others -- had been identified.
The phenomenon is significant. A confluence of factors -- the lowering of
political barriers after the end of the cold war, new information and
communications technologies, lowered transportation costs, and the spread
of democracy -- has created a fertile ground for nongovernmental groups to
widen their reach and form multicountry links, networks, and coalitions.
Some caution is nonetheless in order. In the first place, transnational
civil society is not as new as it sounds. The Roman Catholic Church, to
name just one example, is a transnational civil society group that has
had major international impact for many centuries. Second, most of the
new transnational civil society actors are Western groups projecting themselves
into developing and transitional societies. They may sometimes work in
partnership with groups from those countries, but the agendas and values
they pursue are usually their own. Transnational civil society is thus
"global" but very much part of the same projection of Western political
and economic power that civil society activists decry in other venues.
Third, like civil society within borders, civil society across borders
has its dark side. Hate groups are now hooking up with like-minded extremists
in other time zones, feeding off each others' ugly passions. Organized
crime is a transnational venture par excellence, exemplifying the most
advanced forms of flexible, creative international organization and operation.
In short, transnational civil society is much like domestic civil society
in its essentials. It has been around for a long time but is now growing
quickly, both feeding and being fed by globalization. It carries the potential
to reshape the world in important ways, but one must not oversell its
strength or idealize its intentions. Whether local or global, civil society
realism should not be a contradiction in terms.
WANT TO KNOW MORE?
Sheri Berman's "Civil Society and the Collapse of the
Weimar Republic" (World Politics, April 1997).
Thomas Carothers' Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning
Curve (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1999).
Adam Ferguson's An
Essay on the History of Civil Society (Edinburgh: A.
Kincaid and J. Bell, 1767
Michael Foley and Bob Edwards' "The Paradox of Civil
Society" (Journal of Democracy, July 1996).
Ernest Gellner's Conditions
of Liberty (New York: Allen Lane/Penguin, 1994)
Georg Hegel's Philosophy
of Right (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1896)
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink's Activists Beyond
Borders:
Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998).
Thomas Paine's Rights
of Man (London: H.O. Symonds 1792)
Robert Putnam's "Bowling Alone" (Journal of Democracy,
January 1995).
Kevin Quigley's
For Democracy's Sake: Foundations and Democracy Assistance in Central
Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997)
Jonathan Rauch's Demosclerosis
(New York: Times Books, 1994).
David Rieff's "The False Dawn of Civil Society" (The
Nation, February 22, 1999).
Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K. Anheier's The
Emerging Nonprofit Sector: An Overview (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1994).
Alison Van Rooy's Civil Society and the Aid Industry
(London: Earthscan, 1998).
Alan Wolfein's "Is Civil Society Obsolete?" (Brookings
Review, Fall 1997).