Holley Hewitt Ulbrich, Ph.D.
Alumni Professor of Economics
Senior Fellow at the Strom Thurmond Institute
Clemson University
1994
Business property taxes and corporate income taxes play a modest role in industrial location when choosing among states. Inequality in tax burdens among school districts, however, can influence location within a state. South Carolina's school districts are very unequal in mill rates, expenditures per pupil, taxable property per pupil, and industrial/utility property per pupil. These inequalities are only partly reduced by state aid, which is weighted toward poorer districts. The remaining differences can discourage firms from locating in school districts with a low fiscal surplus--high mill rates and low expenditures per pupil.
Other states have responded to this problem by assigning more
of the responsibility of funding education to the state. A few
states, like Texas and New Mexico, have tried to indirectly equalize
taxable wealth among districts. We propose several remedies that
would reduce potential distortion of industrial location decisions.
All of these remedies call for the state to collect property taxes
on state-assessed (industrial) property for school purposes and
disburse it to school districts on a per-pupil basis. If state-assessed
property was limited to paying school taxes only, while county-assessed
property paid taxes only for city and county purposes, this reform
would also enhance the benefit nature of the property tax and
perhaps mitigate the current anti-property-tax mood.
The location of industrial plants in South Carolina determines
an important component of tax revenues that support local school
districts. When the industrial tax base is large, residential
and other property owners generally pay a smaller part of the
local school bill and often benefit from a richly supported school
district. When industry is scant, the tax burden carried by other
property owners increases. Per pupil expenditures often fall.
Can the system of taxing property be altered to equalize tax burdens
yet preserve or improve the quality of schools? This tough question
lies at the heart of this special report prepared by Dr. Holley
Hewitt Ulbrich, Alumni Professor of Economics and Senior Fellow
with Clemson's Strom Thurmond Institute. Assisted in her work
by Karen Boburg, a graduate student in Economics, Dr. Ulbrich
examines the issues and offers policy options to be considered
by policy makers and other interested parties. The Center for
Policy and Legal Studies supported this work with funds provided
by BB&T of South Carolina and is pleased to make the report
available.
Bruce Yandle
Director
Center for Policy and Legal Studies
I. Introduction
Manufacturing and utility firms, their jobs and their taxable
wealth, are distributed very unevenly across the state of South
Carolina. A heavy concentration of such firms in the upstate,
with smaller concentrations around Columbia and Charleston, gives
those regions of the state a clear advantage in terms of job opportunities,
income, and resources for education. While the state pays about
half the cost of elementary and secondary education, and distributes
the funds in a somewhat equalizing fashion, about 40% of the burden
of paying for K-12 education falls on the property tax.
Many wealthier school districts choose to levy relatively high
tax rates to support quality schools, while others take advantage
of their taxable wealth to reduce the mill rate while still having
adequate resources for schools. In either case, the school district
provides a "fiscal surplus" for a large share of taxpayers--benefits
in terms of educational quality that exceed the cost in terms
of taxes dedicated to schools.
The options are less appealing in the poorer districts of Marion,
Hampton, and Orangeburg County in the low country, which have
to choose between settling for poor schools and imposing high
tax rates that could scare away potential manufacturers, which
can do better in the already manufacturing-intense upstate and
midlands regions. Even with state aid, these districts still deliver
less school quality per dollar of school taxes paid--if not a
fiscal deficit for the representative taxpayer, at least a much
smaller fiscal surplus. The result is to create a disincentive
for industrial location in some of the poorer districts in South
Carolina and increase the concentration of employment and income
in the already prosperous upstate region.
II. Do Taxes Matter?
The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of school tax
and education spending differences in South Carolina school districts
in relation to the manufacturing and utility tax base and identify
possible policy options. States clearly believe that taxes--specifically,
business property taxes and corporate income taxes--are important
in determining the location of new manufacturing plants. Every
state has some package of business location incentives that includes
reductions in property and/or corporate income taxes. A 1984 study
by Bartik examines 13 factors that could explain the location
of new plants among states--the property tax rate, the corporate
tax rate*, the wage rate, unionization*, education levels, unemployment
insurance tax rate*, workers compensation insurance tax rate,
construction costs, land area*, population density, existing manufacturing
activity*, road miles*, and energy prices. Of these factors, only
the six marked with an asterisk (*) were significant in any of
Bartik's regression models, and those six did not include property
taxes. [Bartik, 1984] Particularly strong predictors (in terms
of both robustness across model specifications and size of coefficient)
are existing manufacturing activity, corporate tax rate, and unionization.
Bartik's findings are consistent with those reported in a more
recent survey of such studies by Pomp [1988] and a location decision
study by Runzheimer [1990].
While firms make every effort to ensure that they receive the
best possible package of business location incentives, such incentives
appear to play a relatively modest role in location decisions.
A more recent study by Duffy [1994] finds taxes to be a significant
locational factor in only 7 of 19 two digit (SIC) manufacturing
groups (taxes include all state and local taxes, not just property
taxes). These seven industries were apparel, chemicals, petroleum,
transportation equipment, instruments, and miscellaneous. Even
for those industry groups, however, the weighted importance of
taxes was much smaller than the impact of other factors, particularly
market access and labor market conditions. Both Duffy and Friedman
et al. [1992] find that access to markets and labor market conditions
are consistently the most significant factors in choosing between
states.
While there is an extensive literature on the location choice
among states and regions, however, little attention has been given
to the decision to locate within a state. Particularly in a small
state like South Carolina, many of the other factors influencing
locational choice vary relatively little between regions of the
state. There is an upstate advantage in market access because
of the interstate highways and the proximity to Charlotte and
Atlanta. This area also has a history of manufacturing going back
to the early part of the century that receives a high score on
the measure of existing manufacturing activity. But other relevant
factors, such as unionization and corporate tax rates, are the
same throughout the state. While a firm may choose South Carolina
for the kinds of major reasons suggested above, the choice of
a location within the state is likely to be influenced by factors
that appear much less important on a broader interstate scale.
Property tax differentials, therefore, are much more likely to
influence the choice of where to locate within the state than
the choice of one state over another.
III. School Funding, Property Taxes and Industrial Location
Incentives in South Carolina
South Carolina has 91 public school districts serving children
in kindergarten through 12th grade. Twenty-nine of these districts
encompass an entire county. The remaining 17 counties contain
a total of 62 school districts, ranging from two districts each
in Bamberg, Dorchester, Hampton, Laurens, Richland, and Sumter
Counties to seven districts in Spartanburg County and eight in
Orangeburg County. These 91 districts vary greatly in size, wealth,
and mill rates. Even within counties, there are substantial differences.
Orangeburg's eight districts range in size from 624 pupils in
Orangeburg 8 to 3,358 pupils in Orangeburg 3. Spartanburg's seven
districts have mill rates that range from 131 to 195. In Florence,
with five school districts, manufacturing assessed value per pupil
ranges from $256 in Florence 4 to $3,533 in Florence 5.
Sources of Funds-Schools in South Carolina
are funded from a combination of three sources: the local property
tax (40%), state aid (50%), and federal aid (10%) [USACIR 1992].
The burden of paying for elementary and secondary education has
shifted substantially toward the local property tax sine 1980,
when the property tax paid only 28% of the cost of the public
schools. Resistance to such tax increases led to a major property
tax relief effort by the General Assembly in 1995, but relief
was limited to homeowners through an expanded homestead exemption.
With state funding of $195 million for the expanded homestead
exemption, the balance of funding between local and state sources
will shift to about 32% local and 58% state in 1995-96. This shift
restores the state's share to the level of the early eighties.
The local share is higher than it was a decade ago because of
diminished federal aid to education. However, it is important
to note that this increased share does not contribute to equalization
of resources or reduction of mill rate differentials among districts;
it merely shifts most of the existing property tax burden on homeowners
to the state. Taxes on business property are not affected.
School Taxes on Industry-When new plants are established
in South Carolina, they are offered relief from property taxes,
but only from county (or, where applicable, city) taxes. School
taxes are not part of the relief package, so schools almost always
represent the only property tax claim on a new manufacturing firm.
Firms coming to South Carolina will pay school property taxes
at a millage rate determined by the school district in which they
choose to locate. Those mill rates ranged from 89 mills in York
2 to 276 mills in Hampton 2 in 1993-94. Those rates mean a tax
of $8.90 per $1000 of assessed value ($.085 per $1000 of market
value) of taxable property in York 2 compared to a tax of $27.60
per $1,000 of assessed value and $1.63 per $1,000 of market value
in Hampton 2. Yet a higher tax price does not guarantee that the
manufacturer (or the homeowner) will enjoy a better school, or
even a better funded school. Even after the equalizing effects
of state aid, per pupil spending in South Carolina's 91 school
districts ranges from $4,234 in Hampton 2 (with a mill rate of
276) to $2,870 in Florence 3 (with a mill rate of 102).
IV. Consequences: Inequality Among School Districts
The agglomeration of manufacturing industries in the upstate is
the result of many factors, as indicated above. Regardless of
the causes, however, it is clear that most school districts in
the upstate enjoy a tax advantage, particularly relative to some
of the districts in the low country interior counties. The countywide
school districts in Oconee, Pickens, and Greenville counties,
as well as all five school districts in Anderson County have school
tax rates well below the state average. These three countywide
districts, as well as Anderson 5 (with 40% of Anderson County's
pupils), also have state-assessed manufacturing, utility, and
business personal property per pupil that is well above the state
average in each case.
The other major industrial county in the upstate is Spartanburg,
which has seven school districts. Four of the seven school districts
in Spartanburg County are well above the state average in industrial
property per pupil, and the remaining three range from 88% to
95% of the state average. However, these seven districts choose
to tax themselves more heavily for schools than other upstate
counties, resulting in mill rates and per pupil spending above
the state average.
At the opposite extreme are some of the manufacturing-poor districts
of the low country interior--Hampton, Orangeburg, Marion, Bamberg,
Clarendon, and Allendale. These six counties contain 21 school
districts. All but one (Clarendon 2) are above the state average
in school tax millage. Five of them collected over 200 mills in
1993-94, compared to a state average of 142.2 mills. At the same
time, all but one (Orangeburg 5) are below the state average in
assessed manufacturing, utility and business personal property
per pupil, and 13 of the 21 have less than 60% of the state average
for state-assessed property per pupil.
There are three important consequences of large differentials in the distribution of this substantial component of taxable wealth among school districts. First, these inequalities are probably an obstacle to consolidation of smaller districts into larger, more efficient units. Second, inequalities in the wealth base perpetuate inequalities among districts in per pupil spending for reasons other than local preferences. Third, tax base inequality is sometimes expressed in tax rate differentials that are likely to have some impact on industrial location in ways that will not only perpetuate but actually exacerbate differences in district wealth.
District Size and Wealth-It is interesting to note that
the four upstate counties contain more than 100,000 pupils but
only eight school districts--an average of 13,000 pupils per district.
Even adding Spartanburg County, which has seven school districts,
gives a total of 138,000 pupils in 15 districts, or an average
of 9,200 pupils per district. In contrast, the 21 poor districts
in the low country include 62,212 pupils, or an average of only
3,010 pupils per district.
The segmentation of counties into many small districts is partly
an artifact of history, but it is perpetuated by school tax differentials.
One or more manufacturing plants in one small district is an obstacle
to consolidating school districts because the fortunate district
does not wish to "share the wealth" with other districts.
Orangeburg 5, for example, is the only one of eight districts
in the county with above average state-assessed taxable property
per pupil at $10,777. Four of the other seven districts in Orangeburg
County have less than $6,000 per pupil in state-assessed property
tax base. The same kind of wealth differentials exist in tax-base-rich
Spartanburg County. Spartanburg 3 and Spartanburg 6 both have
more than $15,000 in state-assessed taxable property per pupil,
while less fortunate Spartanburg 1 and Spartanburg 2 have less
than $9,000 per pupil. However, Spartanburg County has some countywide
tax base sharing for school purposes that mitigates these differences.
Measures of Inequality-Table 1 shows the range, mean, and
median for the relevant fiscal variables for the 91 school districts.
Figures 1, 2 , and 3 show the distribution of values for mill
rates (1991), manufacturing (and utility) tax base per pupil (1991),
and per pupil spending (1991-92) for South Carolina school districts.
Note that while the inequality decreases as we move from Figure
1 to Figure 3, the residual inequality is still substantial.
Differences in School Districts in South Carolina
| State-assessed property per pupil (1991) | |||
| High | $67,04 | York 2 | |
| Low | $532 | Clarendon 3 | |
| Mean | $6,855 | ||
| Median | $2,554 | Newberry | |
| Total assessed property per pupil (1991) | |||
| High | $75,883 | York 2 | |
| Low | $3,886 | Marion 3 | |
| Mean | $10,215 | ||
| Median | $8,111 | Allendale 1 | |
| Mill rate (1994) | |||
| High | 276 | Hampton 2 | |
| Low | 89 | Clarendon 2 | |
| Mean | 143.5 | ||
| Median | 139.8 | Abbeville | |
| State aid per pupil (1993) | |||
| High | $3,115 | Marion 4 | |
| Low | $824 | York 2 | |
| Mean | $2,328 | ||
| Median | $2,361 | York 1 | |
| Expenditures per pupil (1993-94) | |||
| High | $4,254 | Hampton 2 | |
| Low | $2,870 | Florence 3 | |
| Mean | $3,276 | ||
| Median | $3,278 | Chesterfield | |
Note: a complete table for all 91 districts for the same period (1991 assessed values, 1991-92 mill rates and expenditures) is given in Appendix 1.
A number of statistical models were estimated using data in Table 1 and the mill rate and per pupil expenditures as dependent variables. The results were generally unsuccessful. However, there is evidence that state aid is inversely related to tax base per pupil. There are too many factors that influence the mill rate and per pupil expenditures to form a clear pattern that can be discerned by rank correlation or regression analysis. Hampton 2, for example, is one of the poorest districts in taxable wealth per pupil, but by choosing the highest mill rate in the state, and with some state aid, they manage to sustain the highest per pupil spending in the state. Conversely, some of the tax-wealthy districts in the upstate, such as Greenville, choose to levy a lower mill rate and have per pupil spending below the state average. It is difficult to isolate the effect of demand influences
(the tax base per pupil), a problem economists call the identification
problem.
Fiscal Surplus as a Location Incentive-To develop a description
of the "tax and education attractiveness" of a district,
we defined two new variables that relate the cost-benefit calculation
for the taxpayer to state-assessed taxable wealth in each district.
The first variable we defined is per pupil spending per mill.
This variable is a proxy for fiscal surplus, or the balance between
public service benefits and tax costs of living in a particular
district. Normally fiscal surplus is defined as the difference
between the benefits and the tax costs. A positive number is a
fiscal surplus, a negative number a fiscal deficit. Taxpayers
would be expected, other things being equal, to locate in that
district that gave them the highest fiscal surplus. Because school
funding comes from outside sources as well, and because we want
to compare across taxpayers with different amounts of taxable
assets, we chose to express the fiscal surplus as a ratio rather
than a difference. The number is meaningful only in a relative
sense. The values ranged from 15.5 (Lexington 3) to 88.3 (York
2) in 1991, with a mean of 32.5. (See Appendix 1).
If we assume that the benefits of the education system to the
average taxpayer are roughly proportional to per pupil spending,
then this variable offers a proxy for marginal benefit per dollar
spent, appropriately scaled to be comparable among districts and
taxpayers. By combining the tax rate and spending variables, we
can overcome some of the identification problem of the relative
influence of demand factors (preference for more education spending)
and tax capacity factors.
The second variable is a measure of state-assessed taxable wealth
per pupil (manufacturing and utility property and the associated
business personal property). This scaled measure is the percent
of the tax base that was state-assessed in 1991, multiplied by
the dollar amount of the total tax base per pupil.
These two variables show a reasonably strong positive relationship
with an R-squared of .44. If we omit the two wealthy coastal school
districts with a very low percent of state-assessed property,
Horry and Beaufort, the R-squared increases to .48, implying that
about half the variance in the fiscal attractiveness of school
district is explained by differences in the manufacturing and
utility component of the tax base.
Since the state provided about half of school revenues in 1991-92
under an equalization formula, this result offers persuasive evidence
that there is a substantial and consistent difference in the fiscal
attractiveness of school districts to firms as well as to commercial
and residential development. Because the property of manufacturers
and utilities is assessed at 2.5 times the rate of owner-occupied
residential property and 1.7 times the rate of commercial property,
these differences in fiscal surplus are greatly magnified for
manufacturing and utility firms.
V. What Do Other States Do?
The issue of inequality in taxable resources among school districts
is one that all states have wrestled with at least since the mid
1970s, when several California state court decisions put the rest
of the country on notice that the state was responsible for guaranteeing
at least minimal standards of educational quality in all its school
districts. The most famous decision, Serrano v. Priest (1979),
ruled that the quality of a child's education should not depend
on the wealth of the district in which that child resides. The
timing of these court decisions on school finance equalization
coincided with the property tax revolt, first in California, then
elsewhere--a backlash against a tax that in 1970 provided about
half of the funding for K-12 education across the nation.
Higher State Funding Shares-There are some common aspects to states' responses to both the property tax revolt and the pressures for school finance equalization. Most states (34 in all) chose to increase the state share of funding for K-12 education. Between 1969-70 and 1989-90, the average share of education funding from the state increased from 40.9% to 47.2% in the United States average. (In 1990, Hawaii led all states in the state share (87.3%), while New Hampshire-with no state broad-based income or sales tax-put most of the school financing burden (88.8%) on local governments and the local property tax.) South Carolina, however, was moving against the trend, shifting more of the funding of education toward the local property tax between 1970 and 1990.
The most widely used remedy in other states was to shift the tax
base supporting education from the local property tax to state
revenue sources, primarily sales taxes, which have risen sharply
in the last decade. This approach attacks both problems at once--school
finance equalization, and property tax relief--although at some
expense in terms of local control and local responsibility. In
California, a study by Thomas Downes [1992] found that California
had indeed greatly reduced disparities in per pupil spending by
1985-86 by shifting a larger share of education funding to the
state level.
The most dramatic recent shift from local to state funding of
education took place in Michigan in 1994, where an effort to abolish
the property tax entirely failed, but resulted in a dramatic shift
away from local property taxes (2/3 of school funding) toward
higher state sales taxes as a major school revenue source. Like
other states, however, Michigan found that it was not feasible
to completely eliminate the role of the property tax in school
financing. There are only three broad-based sources of state and
local taxes--income, sales, and property taxes. With competition
from neighboring states limiting overuse of the first two, the
property tax continues to have a role to play in financing overall
state and local public services, even if that role has been diminished
in the last two decades.
Creative Solutions: Texas and New Mexico-Some states have
also devised unique solutions. Texas, with over 1,000 school districts,
has paired the richest and poorest districts and ordered a direct
transfer from the former to the latter. New Mexico has a long
history of dedicating the property tax to schools (city and county
governments rely on local income taxes), but the state collects
the property tax and redistributes it to school districts.
VI. Policy Options For South Carolina
If South Carolina chooses to reduce inequality among districts
in both per pupil spending and fiscal surplus, the experience
of other states suggests some possible directions for resolution.
The fact that a significant share of the property tax base is
assessed by the state points to several possible options. State
assessed property in South Carolina--manufacturing plants, utilities,
and their personal property--accounted for about 40% of the property
tax base in 1991. If this wealth were distributed uniformly among
school districts, the variations in taxable wealth among districts
would decline substantially. In 1991, the mean taxable wealth
per pupil was $10,215, with a standard deviation of $9,017, and
ranging all the way from $3,886 in Marion 3 to $75,883 in York
2 (Figure 4). If that taxable wealth was "redistributed"
among districts on a per pupil basis, the taxable wealth per pupil
would be unchanged, but the standard deviation would fall to $4,341.
State Collection of Industrial Property Tax-There is no way to redistribute such wealth directly, but it can be done indirectly, as it is in New Mexico and (to a lesser degree) in Texas. The state could collect the property taxes on the property assessed by the state and distribute that revenue among the 91 school districts on a per pupil basis. While this step would not eliminate the need for state aid, it would considerably simplify the problem of distribution of state aid, because the differentials among districts in taxable wealth per pupil would be less than half as large.
Would the tax burden on manufacturers and utilities rise under
such a plan? Not necessarily. There are two possible ways to ensure
that the burden on firms does not rise solely because of this
shift. One is to use a "hypothetical" rate, the one
that would raise the same amount of revenue from state-assessed
property as the existing structure of rates in the 91 school districts.
This method would treat all firms alike, especially new firms,
but would also create massive short term adjustments for established
firms. Some would gain a windfall tax reduction, others experiencing
a sudden jump in property taxes. Such a system would have to be
phased in to minimize the impact on both firms and districts.
The difficulty with relying on a hypothetical rate is that there
is no criterion for what rate to use in future years. The attraction,
however, is a uniform statewide school property tax rate for all
industry.
A second possible redistribution method is for the state to collect
taxes at the locally set school mill rate that applies to residential,
commercial and personal property in that district, but to collect
the revenue at the state level and redistribute it on a per pupil
basis. This solution would avoid the windfall gains and losses
of the uniform statewide rate, but would create other problems
in setting local mill rates. At present, school districts (at
least those that have some degree of fiscal autonomy) must balance
their revenue goals against the fear of discouraging industrial
development in setting the mill rate. Under this proposed system,
the tradeoffs in mill rates and revenues are not entirely internalized
within the districts. A higher mill rate would generate more revenue
for the local school district from homeowners and other locally
taxed property owners, but the higher taxes on industrial property
drive away potential employers without benefiting the local district,
because the revenues go into the multi-district pool. With less
extra revenue per mill, this system would encourage lower property
tax rates but also put more pressure on the state to require a
minimum tax effort and guarantee minimum standards , or to assume
a larger share of funding.
Reassigning Tax Liability Between Industrial and Other Property-A
third option, which could be combined with either of the two rate-setting
options above, is to require industrial (state-assessed) property
to pay only school taxes, exempting all firms, new and old, from
county and city property taxes. Other property--commercial, residential,
agricultural, and personal--would pay city and county taxes but
not school taxes. This change would primarily impact counties,
since industry makes up a much smaller share of municipal tax
bases. If the burden were shifted in this way, the total property
tax burden on industry would actually decline by about $100 million
at 1993 tax levels. The tax burden on homeowners, agricultural
property, and individual personal property would have to rise
by an equal amount to fully fund cities, counties, and special
districts at 1993 tax levels, from approximately $900 million
to $1 billion (based on estimates supplied by the Department of
Revenue). This shift would partly offset the $195 million in school
property tax relief just provided to homeowners by the 1995 General
Assembly, and might require further adjustments in the division
of financing responsibilities between state and local sources.
This proposal is appealing not only because of simplicity but
also in terms of economic theory. The property tax on residential
and commercial property has some aspects of a benefit tax, in
that many of the city and county services it is used to finance
(such as police and fire protection and solid waste collection
and disposal) convey benefits to property. To the extent that
property taxes on residential and commercial property are used
to fund schools, the benefit aspect of the property tax is diluted
for many taxpayers, who do not benefit directly from schools.
Limiting property taxes on county-assessed property to city and
county taxes would enhance the benefit nature of the property
tax and might make it more acceptable to many taxpayers.
Industrial and utility property does require some limited services
from local government, but many of those can be or already are
provided on a fee basis. On the other hand, as major employers,
these firms have a significant vested interest in the quality
of the schools from which they draw their employees and which
the managers' and employees' children attend. With a growing population
of singles, elderly, and childless couples, the direct benefit
link between the home and the school has attenuated, while the
need for a more skilled labor force has strengthened the benefit
aspect of school property taxes for industry.
These three options are not exhaustive, but they do suggest that
there are many ways to provide more equalization of resources
among school districts and reduce existing differences in fiscal
surpluses. From an economic standpoint, eliminating this distortion
in fiscal choice should result in more efficient location decisions
by most taxpayers, but especially industrial taxpayers facing
the highest assessment rate.
Bartik, Timothy J. "Business Location Decisions in the United
States: Estimates of the Effects of Unionization, Taxes, and Other
Characteristics of States," Working Paper No.84-WO5, February
1984, Department of Economics and Business Administration, Vanderbiltt
University, Nashville, TN.
Downes, Thomas A., "Evaluating the Impact of School Finance
Reform on the Provision of Public Education: The California Case,"
National Tax Journal, December 1992, p. 405-419.
Duffy, Neal E. "The Determinants of State Manufacturing Growth
Rates: A Two-Digit-Level Analysis," Journal of Regional
Science, Vol. 34, No. 2, 1994, p. 137-162.
Friedman, Joseph, Daniel A. Gerlowski and Johnathan Silberman,
"What Attracts Foreign Multinational Corporations? Evidence
from Branch Plant Location in the United States," Journal
of Regional Science, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1992, p. 403-418.
Pomp, Richard D., "The Role of State Tax Incentives in Attracting
and Retaining Business," Economic Development Review,
spring 1988, p. 53-62.
Runzheimer International, Corporate Relocation Report 1990;
cited in Alexander, Donna, "Incentives as Economic Development
Tools," Economic Development Review, Fall 1992, p.64-66.
South Carolina Budget and Control Board, Division of Research
and Statistics, South Carolina Statistical Abstract, various
years.
South Carolina Department of Education, Rankings of the Counties
and School Districts of South Carolina, 1993-94 (Columbia,
SC: June 1995).
U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant
Features of Fiscal Federalism 1992 (Washington, DC:
US Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 265.
Profile of South Carolina School Districts
|
| Total $ Per Pupil | State-Assessed $ Per Pupil | in Total | in mills 1991 | State Aid 1990-92 | Outlay |
| Abbeville | 3791 | 9063 | 3871 | 42.71% | 139.80 | 2434 | 4210 |
| Aiken 1 | 24404 | 10332 | 3193 | 30.90% | 118.00 | 2199 | 3622 |
| Allendale | 2374 | 8111 | 4804 | 59.23% | 167.00 | 2515 | 4503 |
| Anderson 1 | 6163 | 8343 | 2544 | 30.49% | 109.20 | 2336 | 3840 |
| Anderson 2 | 3376 | 9164 | 3583 | 39.10% | 123.70 | 2384 | 4018 |
| Anderson 3 | 2325 | 9155 | 4604 | 50.29% | 85.84 | 2304 | 3733 |
| Anderson 4 | 2362 | 20071 | 7271 | 36.22% | 115.90 | 2030 | 4056 |
| Anderson 5 | 10623 | 11769 | 3771 | 32.05% | 112.36 | 2182 | 3915 |
| Bamburg 1 | 1846 | 6423 | 1901 | 29.59% | 164.00 | 2527 | 4141 |
| Bamburg 2 | 1352 | 7099 | 2761 | 38.90% | 143.00 | 2612 | 4569 |
| Barnwell 19 | 1259 | 4472 | 1512 | 33.80% | 105.00 | 2699 | 4195 |
| Barnwell 29 | 1042 | 7091 | 3156 | 44.51% | 121.00 | 2513 | 4398 |
| Barnwell 45 | 2623 | 7505 | 2741 | 36.52% | 135.00 | 2443 | 3879 |
| Beaufort | 12740 | 29787 | 2652 | 8.90% | 91.50 | 1282 | 4459 |
| Berkeley | 27979 | 7770 | 2921 | 37.60% | 123.00 | 2266 | 3596 |
| Calhoun | 2059 | 22782 | 15943 | 69.98% | 105.00 | 1959 | 4908 |
| Charleston | 43984 | 15072 | 3187 | 21.14% | 106.40 | 1923 | 4058 |
| Cherokee | 8090 | 10679 | 4905 | 45.93% | 138.00 | 2252 | 4440 |
| Chester | 6553 | 9093 | 5152 | 56.66% | 131.00 | 2423 | 4057 |
| Chesterfield | 7768 | 8052 | 3982 | 49.45% | 119.25 | 2376 | 3978 |
| Clarendon 1 | 1254 | 9410 | 1578 | 16.77% | 108.00 | 2491 | 4607 |
| Clarendon 2 | 3562 | 5521 | 995 | 18.03% | 96.00 | 2445 | 3643 |
| Clarendon 3 | 1178 | 4000 | 532 | 13.29% | 157.50 | 2530 | 3933 |
| Collenton | 6926 | 10466 | 2815 | 26.90% | 96.00 | 2260 | 4006 |
| Darlington | 12011 | 12856 | 8287 | 64.46% | 113.60 | 2212 | 4316 |
| Dillon 1 | 1015 | 4482 | 1183 | 26.40% | 103.00 | 2577 | 3801 |
| Dillon 2 | 4294 | 5876 | 2448 | 41.66% | 103.00 | 2481 | 3671 |
| Dillon 3 | 1585 | 4370 | 1369 | 31.33% | 103.00 | 2573 | 3841 |
| Dorchester 2 | 14170 | 1984 | 1057 | 53.29% | 140.40 | 2275 | 3667 |
| Dorchester 4 | 2664 | 39722 | 10207 | 25.70% | 117.60 | 2224 | 4433 |
| Edgefield | 3925 | 7657 | 2036 | 26.58% | 109.00 | 2330 | 3863 |
| Fairfield | 4085 | 25362 | 20310 | 80.08% | 137.70 | 1667 | 5382 |
| Florence 1 | 14763 | 10341 | 4123 | 39.87% | 92.30 | 2160 | 3663 |
| Florence 2 | 1261 | 6222 | 1874 | 30.12% | 94.80 | 2619 | 3987 |
| Florence 3 | 4523 | 4023 | 1369 | 34.03% | 94.40 | 2605 | 3610 |
| Florence 4 | 1398 | 5347 | 1266 | 23.68% | 105.30 | 2598 | 3905 |
| Florence 5 | 1365 | 7988 | 4628 | 57.94% | 99.,20 | 2424 | 4018 |
| Georgetown | 10625 | 15385 | 5254 | 34.15% | 147.50 | 1945 | 4479 |
About the author
Holley Hewitt Ulbrich
is Alumni Professor of Economics at Clemson University and a senior
fellow at the Strom Thurmond Institute, with a particular interest
in issues relating to state and local public finance. She holds
the BA, MA and Ph.D. degrees in Economics from the University
of Connecticut and has done consulting work with many federal,
state and local government agencies as well as the World Bank.
